Ranked choice voting strategy

 

I wrote a letter to the editors of both local newspapers on this subject.  This is the gist:

In the San Francisco Mayor’s race, next week, where the first round leader may not get 51%, your ballot can get two votes in the second round if your 1st choice is one of the bottom candidates and your 2nd and 3rd choices are your preferred candidates.  (The bottom two mayoral cadidates, out of 16 choices, are pretty obvious)

The way ranked choice voting works, when the bottom rung candidates are eliminated after the first round of counting their accompanying 2nd and 3rd choices are distributed to the remaining top vote getters.

The consequence is that an optimum strategy, if the first place vote-getter will not win, is to cast your first choice vote for the certain loser.

Interesting.

Frankly, a random selection of politicians would always be better than the 'select the most egomaniacal' approach we currently use.

Ranked choice has demonstrably introduced two new problems. It is not supposed to make candidates more vicious. But it has instead directed campaign malice at the leading candidate on behalf of the rest.

And once a ranked choice second or third placed person is elected there is a greater chance the public will feel confident in recalling that person.